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CANADA UPDATE-HIGHLIGHTS OF

MAJOR LEGAL NEWS AND
SIGNIFICANT COURT CASES FROM

NOVEMBER 2008 THROUGH
JANUARY

2009

Romit S. Cheema*

I.
A.

SUMMARY OF LEGAL NEWS

PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENT TO COURT OF
QUEEN'S BENCH FOR MANITOBA

HE Honorable Glenn D. Joyal was appointed to the Court of
Queen's Bench for Manitoba in January of 2009, replacing the
Honorable Jeffrey J. Oliphant.' The Honorable Oliphant had
elected to become a supernumerary judge. 2 Justice Joyal was a judge of
the Provincial Court of Manitoba for nine years and had been on the
Manitoba Court of Appeal from March 2007 to July 2007. 3 He also
served as a judge of the Court of the Queen's Bench from July 2007 until
his appointment in January of 2009.
B.

PRIME MINISTER OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENT OF
JUSTICE THOMAS CROMWELL TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA

Justice Thomas Cromwell's nomination to the Supreme Court of Canada was confirmed December 22, 2008 by Prime Minister Stephen
S. Cheema is a 2009 candidate for Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman School
of Law. Mr. Cheema has an undergraduate degree in Economics from the University of Texas at Austin and was born and raised in Vancouver, Canada.
1. Office of the Prime Minister, Prime MinisterHarperAnnounces an Appointment to
the Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Jan. 23, 2009, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.
asp?category=1&id=2396.
2. "Under the federal Judges Act, federally appointed judges may, after being in judicial office for at least 15 years and whose combined age and number of years of
judicial service is not less than 80 or after the age of 70 years and at least 10 years
judicial service, elect to give up their regular judicial duties and hold judicial office
as a supernumerary judge." Manitoba Courts, Court of Queen's Bench-Judges,
Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.manitobacourts.mb.ca/qb/qb-judges.html.
3. Supra note 1.
*Romit
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Harper. 4 Prime Minister Harper had planned to hold a public hearing on
the process to bring more transparency to the process, but decided to
bypass those plans.5 Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister retains
6
the final say on Supreme Court of Canada appointments.
II.
A.

RECENT SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS
SENTENCING AND HYBRID OFFENCES-R.

v.

SOLOWAN

Solowan, the accused, pled guilty to three offences, two of which were
hybrid offences. 7 The Crown elected to proceed summarily on the two
hybrid offences. 8 The court sentenced Solowan to fifteen months' imprisonment, to which Solowan appealed and argued that the trial judge had
imposed "the maximum custodial sentence of six months for each offence
without first finding that he was the worst offender who had committed
the worse offence." 9 The appeal was rejected and the court of appeal
stated that the "'maximum sentence.. .was not imposed here. 1It
0 is available only where the Crown elects to proceed by indictment.'"
The Supreme Court held that the Criminal code" applies to both indictable and summary conviction offences. 12 The court stated that: (1) "a
fit sentence for a hybrid offence is neither a function nor a fraction of the
sentence that might have been imposed had the Crown elected to proceed otherwise than it did;" (2) "the sentence for a hybrid offence prosecuted summarily should not be 'scaled down' from the maximum on
summary conviction simply because the defendant would likely have received less than the maximum had he or she been prosecuted by indictment;" and (3) "likewise, on indictment, the sentence should not be
'scaled up' from the sentence that the accused might well have received if
13
prosecuted by summary conviction.'
B.

CRIMINAL LAW-ISSUE ESTOPPEL-R. V. MAHALINGAN

Two issues were before the court in R. v. Mahalingan. The first was
whether a new trial should be ordered because the trial judge's instructions to the jury on the theory of defense were inadequate, and, more
importantly, whether the doctrine of issue estoppel should be retained in
criminal law. 14 The majority held that the court of appeal was correct in
4. Janice Tibbetts, PM names Thomas Cromwell to Supreme Court, NATIONAL POST,

Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1105047.
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. R. v. Solowan, [2008] 299 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 SCC 62 (Can.).
8. Id.

9. Id. 1 2.
10. Id. 6 (quoting R. v. Solowan, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1658, 9, 2007 BCCA 388.).
11. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, Part XXIII, §§ 716, 718.1, 718.2(d), (e), 787(1)
(1985).
12. R. v. Solowan, [2008] 299 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 16, 2008 SCC 62 (Can.).
13. Id. 15.
14. R. v. Mahalingan, [2008] 300 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2008 SCC 63 (Can.).
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ruling that the "jury charge on the theory of the defence in the first trial
15
was inadequate and a new trial should be ordered on that ground.
With regard to issue estoppel, the majority held it should be retained as
part of Canadian criminal law, but clarified that the "current Canadian
approach... should be modified to limit its application to precluding the
Crown's relitigating an issue that has been in the accused's favor in a
prior criminal proceeding, whether on the basis of a positive finding or
reasonable doubt.' 6 The court further clarified that issue estoppel does
not apply in every situation, but instead "only issues either necessarily
resolved in favour of the accused as part of the acquittal or on which
findings were made." 1 7 The accused bears the burden of showing that
particular issue was decided in their favor in a previous proceeding if they
claim issue estoppel. 18

C.

EMPLOYMENT LAW, RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
OBLIGATIONS-SHAFRON

V.

KRG

& FIDUCIARY

INS. BROKERS

(WESTERN) INC.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the Court of Appeal of British Columbia erred by invoking blue-pencil severance and rectification in
its interpretation of a restrictive covenant. 19 Shafron was employed by an
insurance company pursuant to an employment contract which contained
a restrictive covenant "in which S[hafron] agreed that for three years after leaving his employment for any reason other than termination without
cause he [would] not be employed in the business of insurance brokerage
within the 'Metropolitan City of Vancouver." 20 Shafron began working
for another agency in Richmond, B.C. and the insurance company
and also claimed a
brought action to enforce the restrictive covenant
21
obligations.
equitable
and
fiduciary
of
breach
The court found that the court of appeal should not have substituted a
phrase for the term "Metropolitan City of Vancouver" as the term was
uncertain and ambiguous. 22 The court of appeal should not have re-writ24
23
ten the covenant, and neither blue-pencil severance nor rectification
could be applied to re-write the restrictive covenant. 25 Additionally, the
court found that "the findings that S[hafron] was not a fiduciary and did
not abuse confidential information belonging to KRG Western are not
pure questions of law. These findings were based on evidence at trial and
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

Id.
Shafron v. KRG Ins. Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Court defines this as "removing part of a contractual provision." Id.
The Court states that "rectification is used to restore what the parties' agreement
actually was, were it not for the error in the written agreement." Id.
25. Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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must stand in the absence of any palpable and overriding error by the
26
trial judge."

D.

TAx LAW-AVOIDANCE AND "GAAR"-LPsoN v. CANADA

In Lipson v. Canada,a narrow majority (4-3) held that the Appellant,
the Lipsons, had engaged in an avoidance transaction that constituted a
misuse or abuse of the attribution rules under the general anti-avoidance
rule (GAAR). 2 7 The case was the first decision of 2009 and one which
"may have broad implications on the tax planning of many Canadians. '28
The taxpayer Earl Wilson and his wife were a married couple with
plans to purchase a home. 2 9 They engaged in the following set of transactions: (1) wife borrowed $562,500 from a bank to finance purchase of
shares in a family corporation; (2) wife paid the borrowed money directly
to the taxpayer who transferred shares to her; (3) Earl and his wife obtained a mortgage from a bank for $562,500 and then used the mortgage
loan funds to repay the share loan; and (4) on his 1994, 1995 and 1996 tax
returns, Earl "deducted the interest on the mortgage loan and reported
'30
the taxable dividends on the shares as income."
The GAAR rule was summarized by the court as follows:
"The GAAR denies a tax benefit where three criteria are met: the
benefit arises from a transaction (ss. 245(1) and 245(2)); the transaction is an avoidance transaction as defined in ss. 245(3); and the
transaction results in an abuse and misuse within the meaning of s.
245(4). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the first two
of these criteria are not met, while the burden is on the Minister to
prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the avoidance transaction
results in abuse and misuse within the meaning of s. 245(4)".31
The part of the test at issue in this case was the third step, whether a
transaction resulted in misuse and an abuse. 32 The court then set out the
following two-part test: 1) "First, a court must conduct a unified textual,
contextual and purposive analysis of the provisions giving rise to the tax
benefit in order to determine their essential object, spirit and purpose";
2) "a court must determine whether the avoidance transaction frustrates
the object, spirit or purpose of the relevant provisions. '33 Speaking for
the majority, Justice Lebel concluded that:
"The attribution by operation of s. 74.1(1) that allowed the taxpayer
to deduct the interest in order to reduce the tax payable on the divi26. Id.
27. Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1 (Can.).
28. Julian Ho, Use of Income Tax Act's GeneralAnti-Avoidance Rule No ClearerAfter
Lipson, The Court, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.thecourt.ca/2009/01/O9/use-of-incometax-act%E2%80%99s-general-anti-avoidance-rule-no-clearer-after-lipson/.
29. Lipson, 2009 SCC 1 (Can.).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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dend income from the shares and other income, which he would not
have been able to do were the wife dealing with him at arm's length,
qualifies as abusive tax avoidance. It does not matter that s. 74.1(1)
was triggered automatically when the taxpayer did not elect to opt
out of s. 73(1). To allow s. 74.1(1) to be used to reduce the taxpayer's
income tax from what it would have been without the transfer to his
'34
wife frustrates the purpose of the attribution rules."

34. Id.
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